China’s Persistent Push for GDI Inclusion: Bangladesh was initially proposed to join China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) in 2022, and despite delays, China has continued to press for Bangladesh’s inclusion. During the previous administration, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed, but the process stalled. However, China has remained steadfast, with continued efforts to bring Bangladesh into the fold of this major global initiative.
Bilateral Talks with Xi Jinping: Bangladesh’s interim government chief adviser, Dr. Muhammad Yunus meets Chinese President Xi Jinping on March 28. During this bilateral meeting, the GDI issue was the key point of discussion. However, sources indicate that no MoU on GDI signed during this visit, despite China’s proposal to sign approximately 15 MoUs, including GDI.
Strategic ‘Linguistic’ Shift in Bangladesh’s Position: While Bangladesh will not commit to signing any agreements on GDI at this stage, sources reveal that Dhaka has agreed to adopt a slightly more favorable tone toward the initiative. This shift is seen in the “linguistic” changes that will appear in a joint statement following the meeting. Bangladesh will acknowledge the positive aspects of the GDI, though a formal commitment to join the initiative remains uncertain for now.
Background of the GDI: Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the GDI at the UN General Assembly in September 2021. The initiative focuses on promoting balanced, integrated, and inclusive development across the globe, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over 60 countries have already joined the GDI, and China is keen to involve more nations in this global plan.
Balanced Approach by Bangladesh: A local diplomat emphasized that Bangladesh is taking a careful, measured approach to the GDI. Although no final decision has been made on full participation, Bangladesh is not opposed to the initiative. The country’s foreign affairs advisor, Towhid Hossain, reiterated that Bangladesh has not yet made a decision on joining but does not see any objection to it.
Bangladesh’s Cautious Stance on International Agreements: Former Bangladesh ambassador to China, Munshi Faiz Ahmed, explained that Bangladesh’s slow approach to GDI reflects the country’s desire to avoid rushing into international commitments. Bangladesh is already involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aligns with the goals of the GDI. However, Bangladesh may choose to refrain from signing official agreements at this time, especially regarding China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI).
Future of Bangladesh-China Relations: Despite the cautious approach, Bangladesh remains engaged with China on key international initiatives. The government’s strategy appears to be one of gradual alignment, signaling a desire to maintain strong bilateral ties while carefully navigating the complexities of global initiatives like the GDI.
No Immediate Commitments: While the discussions with China during Dr. Yunus’s visit may include some positive language changes regarding the GDI, it is clear that Bangladesh is not yet ready to make any formal commitment to the initiative. The country is focused on maintaining flexibility and balancing its interests in the evolving global landscape.
Bangladesh’s Rejection of GDI under Previous Government: During the previous administration, China made several attempts to include Bangladesh in its Global Development Initiative (GDI). These efforts were made through meetings involving foreign secretaries, ministers, and even top leaders. However, the government of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina refrained from joining the GDI, using various diplomatic strategies to maintain distance from the initiative. In July 2024, during Sheikh Hasina’s visit to China, Bangladesh ultimately backed out of an MoU signing on the GDI, leaving China somewhat disappointed after being informed prior to the visit that the memorandum would not be signed.
New Direction under Interim Government: Following the change of government on August 5, 2024, Bangladesh’s interim administration, led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus, has taken a more cautious and pragmatic approach towards its relationship with China. Beijing, sensing an opportunity in the wake of shifts in both regional and global geopolitics, has pursued efforts to engage the interim government, especially around issues related to India. Despite the changing political dynamics, Bangladesh’s alignment with Chinese interests appears to be softening.
Successful Visit to China by Foreign Affairs Advisor: The first major diplomatic visit by Bangladesh’s interim Foreign Affairs Advisor, Towhid Hossain, to China in January 2025 was viewed as a success. During this visit, key agreements were made, including the extension of loan repayment terms, reduced interest rates, and the establishment of medical facilities for Bangladeshi citizens in China. Notably, the visit was marked by a high degree of Chinese hospitality, with security provided for the advisor and his team from Dhaka to Beijing and back.
GDI Continues to Be a Priority for China: During Towhid Hossain’s visit, China once again raised the issue of GDI, including it in the proposed MoUs for Dr. Yunus’s upcoming visit. Beijing is looking for tangible progress on the GDI front and is hopeful that Bangladesh will adopt a more favorable stance towards the initiative.
One China Policy and Diplomatic Shifts: Bangladesh’s position on China’s One China policy has remained a cornerstone of bilateral ties, with the country reiterating its commitment to recognizing Taiwan as part of China. However, China has proposed that Bangladesh return to the specific wording used in a 2005 joint declaration between the two countries, which solidified Bangladesh’s recognition of Taiwan as part of China. The shift would align with the stance taken during the previous BNP government, which supported China’s policy on Taiwan more explicitly.
Diplomatic Sources Weigh In: A local diplomat noted that while Bangladesh has consistently supported China’s One China policy, Beijing’s desire to reaffirm the 2005 position represents a shift from previous language. The diplomat expressed uncertainty about whether Bangladesh would fully embrace the 2005 formulation in the new joint statement.
Chief Advisor’s Upcoming Visit and Expected Outcomes: Dr. Yunus is scheduled to visit China from March 26 to 29, where he will attend the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) conference on March 27 in Hainan. He is also set to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People on March 28, followed by a visit to Huawei’s headquarters. On March 29, Peking University will confer an honorary doctorate on Dr. Yunus. During the visit, Bangladesh is expected to sign six to eight MoUs, with four announcements anticipated, including the announcement of a loan ranging from $1 to $2 billion to finance key infrastructure projects, such as the development of the Mongla Port.
Strategic Diplomacy between Bangladesh and China: As Bangladesh continues to navigate its diplomatic landscape, the growing influence of China on key issues like GDI and the One China policy is becoming more apparent. The upcoming visit by the Chief Advisor to China represents a critical moment for both countries as they look to strengthen ties while addressing economic and political challenges in the region.
